Abstract. We consider general resource assignment games involving selfish users/agents in which users compete for resources and try to be assigned to those which maximize their own benefits (e.g., try to route their traffic through links which minimize the latency of their own traffic). We propose and study a mechanism design approach in which an allocation mechanism assigns users to resources and charges the users for using the resources so as to induce each user to truthfully report a private piece of information he/she holds (e.g., how much traffic he/she needs to transmit). This information is crucial for computing optimal (or close to optimal) allocations and an agent could misreport his/her information to induce the underlying allocation algorithm to output a solution which he/she likes more (e.g., which assigns better resources to him/her).
Introduction
Selfish routing games have been the subject of several studies because of their applications to situations, typical in the Internet, where different entities compete for shared resources and may act selfishly, trying to increase their own benefits. The simplest example of such a game has been studied in the seminal paper by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [1999] . Here, we have m parallel communication links and a set of n selfish agents, with agent i owning a piece of unsplittable traffic of weight t i . Links can have different speeds and each agent chooses the link to use for routing his/her traffic so as to minimize his/her expected latency, even though this may lead to a globally inefficient solution. The KoutsoupiasPapadimitriou (KP) model does not assume central coordination (in the sense of a manager that centrally decides routes for the agents) nor are agents assumed to coordinate their routing strategies. A natural approach for analyzing this scenario comes from microeconomics and game theory and uses the well-known concept of Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] ). Roughly speaking, in a Nash equilibrium an agent cannot benefit by unilaterally changing his/her "strategy" (in the KP model, to pick a different link). Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [1999] propose to study the coordination ratio as the measure of the loss of performance due to lack of cooperation among the selfish agents: Given a global optimization function (e.g., minimizing the maximum link congestion), how bad is the worstcase Nash equilibria? In other words, the coordination ratio measures the "price of the anarchy." For this simple game it is possible to have a Nash equilibrium that costs (log m/ log log log m) times the optimum [Czumaj and Vöcking 2002] . This result suggests to consider alternatives to the anarchic policy so as to induce agents to perform strategies which result in better (possibly optimal) system performance. In this work, we propose a mechanism design approach in order to obtain better resource allocation. We first consider the very same network of the KP model in which a scheduler assigns traffic to links. The main difficulty is the fact that the scheduler must compute an allocation based on the amount of traffic that each agent declares to be willing to route; this value may be different from the true one and an agent could misreport this piece of information to manipulate the scheduler and reduce his/her latency. We thus augment the algorithm with suitable payment functions which charge users for using the links and whose purpose is to make truthtelling convenient for the agents (see Section 2 for formal definitions). The resulting issue is a mechanism design problem in which we want to schedule selfish jobs (i.e., traffic) on parallel related machines (i.e., links), as opposed to that of scheduling (nonselfish) jobs on selfish machines, as investigated by Archer and Tardos [2001] . In both cases, the objective is to minimize the makespan, that is, the maximum link congestion.
The study of this simple setting (i.e., the networks in the KP model) allows for a direct comparison with other approaches to cope with selfish agents (e.g., allowing selfish routing [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999] , suggesting a good Nash equilibrium [Feldmann et al. 2003 ], and inducing good Nash equilibria via scheduling policies "internal" to the machines [Christodoulou et al. 2004] ). Nevertheless, the relative simplicity of this model makes it possible to isolate fundamental aspects of resource allocation problems involving selfish users. We indeed derive a general technique for designing mechanisms for generalizations of this basic problem, including: (i) routing over arbitrary networks; (ii) cost functions other than the maximum link congestion; (iii) the case in which both machines and jobs are owned by selfish agents; and (iv) agents owning more than one job.
1.1. OUR CONTRIBUTION. In this article we investigate a general resource assignment (RA) game (which includes the notable example of the selfish routing game of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou) from the following prospective based on mechanism design. In the mechanism resource assignment (MRA) game we consider an allocation algorithm A which computes an allocation of requests to resources. Agents can neither directly choose the resources nor refuse the allocation chosen by the allocation algorithm. However, they may still manipulate the system by reporting false information about their requests (see Section 2 for a formal description of our model). The allocation algorithm is also allowed to charge each agent for the use of resources. We are interested in allocation algorithms for which there exists a payment function P such that the strategy of reporting the truth about their own requests constitute a Nash equilibrium for all agents. In this case the pair (A, P) is called an NE-truthful mechanism (see Definition 1). Allocations computed by A are associated with a cost and we would like A to output an allocation of minimum-cost. Since in most cases, computing the minimum-cost allocation is computationally hard, we consider approximate mechanisms and measure the quality of a mechanism (A, P) by its approximation ratio; that is, the ratio between the cost of the allocation computed by A and that of an optimal allocation.
In Section 3, we start by characterizing the class of allocation algorithms that induce an NE-truthful mechanism for quasi-one-parameter agents (see Definition 3). The class of quasi-one-parameter agents is a generalization of the well-studied class of one-parameter agents [Myerson 1981; Archer and Tardos 2001] . Interestingly, agents of MRA games are quasi-one-parameter (see Definition 3), though not one-parameter. We show that monotone algorithms that characterize truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents [Myerson 1981; Archer and Tardos 2001] also characterize NE-truthful mechanisms for quasi-one-parameter agents. This result represents the "kernel" of several interesting problems which can be formulated in terms of MRA games: For these problems, the existence of (optimal/polynomialtime) NE-truthful mechanisms reduces to the existence of (optimal/polynomialtime) monotone algorithms. We also show that rather simple MRA games do not admit exact mechanisms with dominant strategies.
Mechanism Design for the KP Model (Section 4)
. We focus on a particular MRA game, which we call the MKP game, that is a mechanism design version of the routing problem in the KP model [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999] : In our game, agents are not allowed to pick the link where to route their traffic; a scheduler allocates the traffic (i.e., jobs) on the links (i.e., parallel related machines) and the agents cannot refuse the allocation chosen by the scheduler. However, they may still manipulate the system by reporting false information on the size of their own jobs (see Section 2 for a formal description of our model). We investigate the benefits of replacing the anarchic policy of having agents choose their own route with a scheduling algorithm which, when combined with a suitable payment function, yields a mechanism inducing the agents to report the correct information (see Section 2 for a formal definition of these concepts). We measure such benefits by considering how good the makespan of the solution computed by the mechanism can be with respect to the optimal. In other words, we investigate the approximation ratio that a mechanism for our game(s) can achieve. Since the problem is NP-hard, even for two machines with identical speeds, we focus on both exponential-time and polynomial-time mechanisms. In particular, negative results on exponential-time mechanisms show that the inapproximability of the problem does not arise because of its computational intractability, but rather from the "lack of altruism" of selfish agents.
We characterize the existence of approximation mechanisms depending on (the combination of) the following factors:
-the ratio r between the largest and smallest machine speeds. In more general settings, r quantifies how much resources can differ (e.g., in the problem of routing in general networks, r is the ratio between the longest and shortest paths towards the destination); -whether we consider mechanism, inducing Nash equilibria, or stronger ones with dominant strategies (i.e., NE-truthful or truthful mechanisms, formally defined in Section 2.2); and -the number m of machines.
We characterize the class of NE-truthful mechanisms in terms of job-monotone algorithms: Roughly speaking, these algorithms assign jobs monotonically, that is, if we increase the size of one job then this job cannot be moved to a slower machine (see Definition 3). This condition is also necessary for mechanisms of stronger type (i.e., truthful with dominant strategies), though some of our results imply that it is not sufficient. Moreover, this requirement can be considered as the dual of the monotonicity for scheduling problems involving selfish machines [Archer and Tardos 2001] : There, slowing down one machine causes a decrease of its assigned work.
From our characterization we derive upper and lower bounds showing that a crucial factor is the ratio r between machine speeds. For r = 1, every algorithm is job-monotone and thus exact solutions can be implemented in general, that is, for any cost function (see Corollary 12). If we consider our setting where the makespan is the cost function, (1 + )-approximate solutions can be obtained in polynomial time. By contrast, it is impossible to obtain truthful mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms for which truth-telling is a dominant strategy) that achieve approximation better than 5/4, even if we allow exponential running time and consider two machines with the same speed (see Theorem 19).
For every r > 1, no NE-truthful mechanism can guarantee (1 + )-approximate makespan, for some > 0, even if we consider exponential-time mechanisms for the case of two machines only. Our results show that optimal solutions can be obtained if and only if resources are all of the same type (i.e., r = 1). The negative results for r > 1 are complemented by a constant-ratio NE-truthful mechanism for Here, the game is routing on networks of the KP model or scheduling selfish jobs on related machines.
any number of machines (even nonconstant) having arbitrary speeds. This mechanism is online and achieves a competitive ratio of 8 (see Table I for a summary of our results for the MKP game). Payments satisfy the natural no positive transfer condition, that is, no agent receives money from the mechanism and thus users pay for routing their traffic.
Notice that truthful mechanisms are stronger than NE-truthful ones. Indeed, dominant strategies guarantee that even in presence of "irrational" agents that deviate, truth-telling remains the strategy maximizing the utility of every other agent. This is not the case for NE-truthful mechanisms, where other Nash equilibria are possible (i.e., with some agents being not truth-telling). However, reaching such alternative Nash equilibria may be difficult for the agents, since they will have to coordinate amongst themselves. Moreover, our results show that, if we want to obtain good approximate solutions, then we have to content ourselves with NE-mechanisms (see Table I for the case r = 1). Obviously, lower bounds for NE-truthful mechanisms apply to truthful ones. 1.1.2. More General Settings (Section 5). We consider a scenario in which both jobs and machines are owned by selfish agents. This extension of the MKP game represents a situation in which some users compete for resources while others own them. For this game, we present an online mechanism achieving a competitive ratio of 12 for any number of machines with verifiable arbitrary speeds (see Corollary 22).
Our characterization for quasi-one-parameter agents yields a general technique for designing mechanisms for any MRA game. A natural application of these results is to the problem of routing n pieces of unsplittable traffic between n pairs of nodes in an arbitrary graph. For this problem, NE-truthful mechanisms are characterized by routing algorithms which do not shorten the length of the path used for connecting a pair of nodes if the corresponding traffic demand increases. Our negative results for the MKP model when r > 1 imply that such algorithms cannot minimize the maximum link latency, even when links are identical (a network of the KP model can be seen as a network with identical links connecting a source to a destination via disjoint paths of different lengths). In other words, even for identical links, exact solutions can be achieved only if we assume (a rather simple) combinatorial structure of the network (e.g., parallel identical links, as in the KP model). 1.1.3. Agents Owning Several Jobs (Section 6). We conclude with another extension of the KP model which cannot be formulated in terms of quasi-oneparameter agents (and thus, as an RA game). This extension considers the case in which agents own more than one job and is motivated by a scenario in which users' traffic is routed by n selfish providers, those of whom offer better service (lower latency) able to charge higher fees (see Section 6 for a more detailed discussion of the model). We first show that no
-approximate solution can be achieved even when considering exponential-time truthful mechanisms for the case of two identical machines and at most two jobs per agent. This result contrasts with the (1 + )-approximate mechanism for identical speeds, when each agent owns one job. Motivated by this negative result, we turn our attention to truthful approximate mechanisms and give upper and lower bounds on the approximation ratio of such mechanisms (see Table II ). Some of our positive results are obtained via new polynomial-time approximation algorithms which can be combined with suitable payment functions to obtain NE-truthful mechanisms achieving the same approximation ratio.
1.2. RELATED WORK. A number of papers for (variants of) the KP model [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999] have studied the problem of characterizing, computing, and bounding the cost of Nash equilibria for the corresponding routing problem [Mavronicolas and Spirakis 2001; Czumaj and Vöcking 2002; Fotakis et al. 2002; Ferrante and Parente 2004; Even-Dar et al. 2003; Feldmann et al. 2003 ] (see also Roughgarden and Tardos [2000] and Roughgarden [2001] for a different model considering splittable traffic on arbitrary networks). In the anarchic scenario in which agents decide by themselves, the final solution (a Nash equilibrium) can have a cost (log m/ log log log m) times the optimum [Czumaj and Vöcking 2002] ; this ratio is the price of anarchy for the case of arbitrary speeds, while the case of identical speeds has only a slightly better price of anarchy of (log m/ log log m) [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999; Czumaj and Vöcking 2002; Koutsoupias et al. 2003 ]. Feldmann et al. [2003] show how to compute in polynomial time a Nash equilibrium for the KP model whose cost is at most (1 + )-times the optimum, for every > 0. They prove this result via a Nashification technique which converts any given scheduling with makespan C into one which is a Nash equilibrium and whose makespan is at most C. Christodoulou et al. [2004] suggest a way of reducing the effect of selfishness by changing the internal scheduling policy of the machines. A remarkable fact here is that for identical speeds, this approach reduces the effect of selfishness in the KP model from (log m/ log log m) down to 4/3 − 1/m [Christodoulou et al. 2004 ].
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The authors also conjecture that this ratio is the best possible with this kind of approach (termed a coordination mechanism).
The price of anarchy [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999] , introduced in the context of the KP model, can be seen as the worst-case approximation ratio that agents will reach by themselves. However, it is not clear how agents will converge to a Nash equilibrium, and Even-Dar et al. [2003] indeed show that for some natural strategies, this may take an exponential number of moves in the KP model (at each step some agent moves his/her piece of traffic to the link which currently gives the minimum latency). The price of anarchy has been studied also in other atomic congestion games [Cominetti et al. 2006; Roughgarden 2005] . In recent papers [Hayrapetyan et al. 2006; Fotakis et al. 2006 ] games with static coalitions have been considered.
In the attempt to cope with the negative effects of selfishly acting agents, the elegant theory of mechanism design (see the milestone papers by Vickrey [1961] , Clarke [1971] and Groves [1973] ) has been recently applied to a number of optimization problems arising in the context of network optimization Ronen 2000, 1999; Archer and Tardos 2001] . These are resource assignment problems, typically arising from the Internet, in which the agents can lie about the type of resources they hold (e.g., about the links'/machines' processing time). Nisan and Ronen [1999] pointed out that classical mechanism design techniques (VCG mechanisms [Vickrey 1961; Clarke 1971; Groves 1973] ) are not suitable for certain scheduling/routing problems. Archer and Tardos [2001] considered the problem of scheduling jobs on parallel related machines (i.e., each agent corresponds to a link in the network of the KP model). They observed that this problem belongs to a wider class of problems involving one-parameter agents (see Definition 3), for which the design of a truthful mechanism reduces to that of designing a monotone algorithm (see Definition 3). This result is closely related to a certain type of auction in which the auctioneer (i.e., the mechanism) offers identical items to a set of buyers (i.e., selfish agents), and was considered by Myerson [1981] . In this work we exploit the results in Myerson [1981] and Archer and Tardos [2001] , although our problems are not one-parameter (indeed, our MKP game is harder then its dual in Archer and Tardos [2001] , since the former does not admit exact solutions, while the latter does).
1.3. ROADMAP. In Section 2 we formally define our model and the basic concepts/definitions used throughout the article; in particular, Section 2.2 presents the mechanism design approach. In Section 3 we characterize NE-truthful mechanisms for quasi-one-parameter agents and for MRA games. We apply these results to the MKP game in Section 4 where we prove upper and lower bounds (Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively). We extend this model in Section 5. In particular, in Section 5.1 52:8 V. AULETTA ET AL.
we consider machines that are owned by selfish agents; in Section 5.2 we consider the problem of routing in general networks. Section 6 deals with the case of agents owning more than one job. The effects of changing the internal scheduling policy are discussed in Section 7, together with a number of open problems and possible research directions.
Resource Assignment Games
In this article we consider the following resource assignment game, which we call the RA game. We have a set R of n requests and a set S of m resources. A feasible solution X is an allocation of resources to requests. We consider the general setting in which the ith request is associated with a weight t i and, for a feasible solution X , the processing time of request i is equal to
where
of the weights of all requests other than i. In other words, the completion time of request i consists of two parts: the first part res i (X ) · t i depends on the solution X and on the weight t i of the request; the second part add i (X |t −i ) depends on the solution X and on the weights t −i of other requests. For example, the requests can be communication bids of different weights between a source u and a destination v in a network, and the resources the edges of the underlying communication graph. A solution X satisfies each of the requests by assigning a u-v path to each of them. In this case, res i (X ) can be seen as a cost per unit of traffic, given the path that X assigns to i, and add i (X |t −i ) as an additional cost due to the fact that these resources must be shared with other users.
Each request is owned by a selfish agent who, naturally, would prefer solutions where his/her own request is processed faster. Specifically, in the RA game, each agent i associates his/her request to some set of resources (chosen according to some probability distribution) and the set of resources chosen by each agent defines a solution X . Given the vector of the request weights t = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ), agent i assigns to solution X value v i (X |t), defined as
that is, the opposite of the processing time of his/her own request (e.g., the time required for having his/her own traffic transmitted). Hence, the valuation function 2 v i (X |t) expresses how much agent i "likes" the assignment X , given his/her request of weight t i and that the agent prefers solutions for which he/she gives a high valuation. This may be in contrast with the main goal of computing solutions which are globally optimal, that is, solutions which allocate resources to minimize some cost function cost(X |t).
2.1. THE KP GAME. The KP game [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999 ] is a special case of the RA game. Here the resources are m parallel links of different speeds (s 1 , . . . , s m ), the ith request consists of one unsplittable piece of traffic of weight t i , and each request is to be allocated to one of the m links. If a link of speed s is allocated to requests of total weight w, then all these requests will be completed in time w/s. Each agent owns one request (the generalization to more than one request per agent is given in Section 6) and wishes to minimize his/her own latency. The global goal is instead to minimize the maximum latency. The problem is easily seen to be equivalent to the following scheduling problem. We have n jobs of weights (t 1 , . . . , t n ) which need to be allocated to a set of m related machines of speeds (s 1 , . . . , s m ); the completion time of machine j in allocation X is equal to w j (X |t)/s j , where w j (X |t) is the sum of the weights of jobs in X j , that is, the set of jobs assigned by X to machine j. Jobs are processed in round-robin fashion and thus, all jobs assigned to the same machine finish approximately at the same time. Thus, if job i is assigned to machine j then the completion time of job i can be written as
. One can cast the KP game into the more general setting of RA games by letting
where j is the machine to which X assigns job i. The global optimization function is the makespan, that is, the maximum machine completion time.
The KP game models the case in which agents perform selfish routing over parallel links; that is, each agent chooses a link according to some probability distribution which maximizes his/her own valuation (i.e., the agent picks the probability distribution that minimizes the expected completion time of his/her own jobs). Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [1999] introduce the concept of price of anarchy or coordination ratio, that is, the ratio between the cost (i.e., makespan) of the worst Nash equilibrium and the optimal cost. For this specific game it has been shown that the price of anarchy is (log m/ log log log m) [Czumaj and Vöcking 2002] .
A MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH.
In this work, we consider a mechanism design approach to the RA game. In the resulting game, which we call the MRA game, an allocation algorithm A computes a feasible allocation of requests to resources, instead of allowing each agent to choose which resources to allocate to his/her request. Since it is unreasonable to assume that algorithm A has knowledge of the weight of each request, we assume that A elicits this information from the agent owning the request and computes an allocation based on the weights of the requests as reported by the agents. Agent i can influence the allocation algorithm by misreporting the weight t i of his/her request to the algorithm. The payment functions, as well as the allocation algorithm A, are known to the agents. In the literature, a pair M = (A, p A ) is termed a mechanism. So, each agent becomes willing to maximize his/her utility (or net profit) u i M (·), which is defined as
We assume that agents are selfish but rational, that is, they declare a false value only if they can obtain a strictly larger utility. To stress that agent i can only change the ith value b i of b, we distinguish the declared values of the other agents by introducing the notation
We consider two solution concepts that have been studied for mechanisms: NEtruthful mechanisms and mechanisms truthful with respect to dominant strategies. Roughly speaking, in an NE-truthful mechanism, truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium and thus, no agent has an incentive to unilaterally change his/her strategy if the other agents say the truth (see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] 
NE-truthful mechanisms are commonly known as Bayesian-Nash implementations [Osborne and Rubinstein 1994] . A stronger solution concept consists in requiring that truth-telling is the best strategy for a player, regardless of the strategy adopted by other players. 
Our setting leads to a variant of the KP game, which we call the MKP game, in which agents are not allowed to pick the link to use for routing their traffic, but instead an allocation algorithm A, based on the reported weights of the requests, assigns each request to a link. Thus, agents may misreport the weight of their traffic so as to indirectly pick better links. Observe that in our variant, we assume that the mechanism is not able to verify whether the agent is reporting the real weight b i or a different one. It can only compute the allocation and payments, and cannot verify the real cost of the solution. Indeed, in practice, it may be too expensive to keep track of the actual amount of traffic sent by each user, thus preventing the possibility of checking, for instance, whether b i < t i . Moreover, a user may report b i > t i and actually send an amount of traffic equal to b i by just padding the original traffic with some "fake" traffic up to the declared value b i . 
The cost cost( A(b)|t) of solution A(b) is the makespan with respect to the true input t. According to our terminology, this is
In the sequel, for the sake of readability, we will sometimes omit b −i , t −i , A, and M in the previous definitions and simply use p i (b i ), and
A Characterization of NE-Truthful Mechanisms
In this section we introduce the notion of quasi-one-parameter agents and characterize the NE-truthful mechanisms for them as those mechanisms for which the allocation algorithm is monotone. Since MRA games involve quasi-one-parameter agents, this result characterizes NE-truthful mechanisms for all MKP games.
We start by reviewing the notions of a one-parameter agent and a monotone allocation algorithm. 
Myerson [1981] proved that monotone algorithms A characterize truthful mechanisms in the case of one-parameter agents in the sense that an algorithm A admits payment functions P such that (A, P) is a truthful mechanism if and only if A is monotone. Archer and Tardos [2001] gave an alternative form for the payments which can be used for obtaining polynomial-time mechanisms. 
where the h i 's are arbitrary scaling functions.
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Next we introduce the notion of a quasi-one-parameter agent and give a necessary and sufficient condition on an algorithm A for the existence of payment functions Q such that (A, Q) is NE-truthful. 
PROOF. Fix agent i and vector t
. Pick x < y and consider the two cases in which the true type of agent i is t i = x and the case t i = y. Being NE-truthful requires the following two inequalities to hold.
A (x) By summing them up we obtain 
4 We stress that we have a different payment scheme for each choice of the scaling functions h i and thus we should have used the more precise (and more cumbersome) notation P 
In other words, the utility of the quasi-one-parameter agent i According to the definition of a monotone algorithm (Definition 3), the preceding result states that res i (A(b i , b −i )) must be monotone nonincreasing in b i , for all i and b −i . This requirement has a natural interpretation: The algorithm is not allowed to worsen the resources allocated to an agent if his/her communication request increases.
Mechanisms for the MKP Game
In this section we apply our characterization for MRA games to the MKP game. We have the following definition. A natural requirement for the mechanism is the satisfaction of the NPT (no positive transfer) condition; that is, no agent should be paid by the system to use the resources. 
where add i is defined as in Eq.
(1). By Theorem 7, (A, q A ) is NE-truthful for the MKP game. We next prove that (A, q A ) satisfies the NPT condition. We have
where the last inequality holds because res i (A(u, b −i )) is monotone with respect to u. Observe that
Hence we have that q i A (b) ≤ 0 and thus the theorem holds. 4.1. UPPER BOUNDS FOR THE MKP GAME. In this section we give upper bounds on the approximation ratio achievable by NE-truthful mechanisms for the MKP game.
We first consider the case of machines with identical speeds and observe that every allocation algorithm A is job-monotone (see Definition 4). Theorem 11 implies the following result. The previous result applies to any cost function for which A is c-approximate. In particular, for the problem of minimizing the makespan there exists a polynomialtime NE-truthful (1+ )-approximation mechanism, for every > 0 (see Hochbaum and Shmoys [1987] ).
For the case of machines of different speeds we provide an upper bound on the approximation achievable by an NE-truthful mechanism for the MKP game. We do so by giving a sufficient condition for an algorithm to be job-monotone and then showing that the online algorithm of Aspnes et al. [1997] satisfies such a condition.
In general, an online algorithm A can be seen as consisting of two functions and . Function takes as input the current allocation X i , the size of the current job t i , and the speed of a machine s j . When a new job arrives, A evaluates for all machines. The job will be allocated to a machine s j for which (X i , t i , s j ) = 1. If this is the case for more than one machine, then the actual machine receiving the job is determined by evaluating function on the current allocation X i and on the set of machines S for which (X i , t i , s j ) = 1.
In the next definition, we define regular online algorithms as algorithms for which enjoys a monotonicity property and selects the slowest machine from S .
Definition 13. An online allocation algorithm A for the MKP game is regular if there exist functions and such that for all speed vectors (s 1 , . . . , s m ):
(1) If (A(t 1 , . . . , t i−1 ), s j , t i ) = 0, then for all t i > t i it holds that (A(t 1 , . . . , t i−1 ), s j , t i ) = 0 as well. (2) assigns the ith job of weight t i to the slowest machine j for which (A(t 1 , . . . , t i−1 ), s j , t i ) = 1.
It can be easily seen that the following theorem follows directly from the definition of regular algorithms.
THEOREM 14. A regular allocation algorithm A is job-monotone.
The next theorem shows that there exists an NE-truthful mechanism that guarantees constant approximation ratio.
THEOREM 15. There exists an 8-approximate NE-truthful mechanism for the online MKP game. This mechanism satisfies the NPT condition.
PROOF. Consider the online 8-competitive algorithm Assign-R presented in Aspnes et al. [1997] . Each job is assigned to the least capable machine, that is, the slowest machine such that the cost of the resulting assignment stays below := 2 , where is the minimum makespan. If the minimum makespan is not known, then a simple doubling technique is used.
It is easy to see that algorithm Assign-R is regular, from which the theorem follows.
LOWER BOUNDS.
In this section, we give lower bounds on the approximation ratio achievable by (NE-)truthful mechanisms for the MKP game for machines of different speeds. The idea is the following: Given a set of m machines, we construct two sets of jobs of weights t and t , where t differs from t only for the weight of job j, which is one of the jobs allocated to the fastest machine on input t. By Theorem 10, the allocation algorithm must be job-monotone and thus, job j has to be allocated to the same machine also for instance t . By selecting appropriately the weight t j , we obtain that any optimal algorithm allocates this job to a different machine. Therefore, the optimal allocation cannot be used in an NE-truthful mechanism and the mechanism must be suboptimal. By carefully picking t and t we can bound the achievable approximation ratio from below.
We present our lower bounds as a function of the ratio between the largest and smallest machine speeds. We define r := s max /s min , where s max := max 1≤i≤m {s i } and s min := min 1≤i≤m {s i }. Notice that our lower bounds approach 1 when r goes to infinity. This is not surprising; the approximation ratio of the algorithm that assigns all jobs to the fastest machine tends to 1 as r grows.
In the proof of the lower bounds we use the notation opt(x → s) to denote the minimum cost of all allocations that assign the job of weight x to the machine of speed s. We have m jobs of weight 1 and one job of size x = 2/r . For r < 2, the optimum solution has cost 2/r . Any solution assigning the job of size x to machine of speed r > 1 has cost at least min{2, (1 + 2/r )/r }.
THEOREM 16. For any two machines for which 2r is an integer, no deterministic (NE-) truthful mechanism for the MKP game can guarantee c-approximate solutions, for c <
PROOF. Consider two machines of speed 1 and r ≥ 1 and a set of 2r jobs of weight 1. Clearly, the optimum has cost at most 2. Consider an NE-truthful mechanism M = (A, p).
If A assigns no jobs to the faster machine then the cost of the solution is 2r and the approximation ratio is at least r . Since r ≥ 1, we have that r ≥ 1 + r − 1 2r 2 − r and the theorem follows. Suppose now that A assigns at least one job to the faster machine. Let j be the index of one such job. We consider the set of jobs of weights t = (1, . . . , x, 1, . . . , 1), where the j th job has weight x = 2 − 1/r , and we show that A has to compute a nonoptimal allocation on t . By Corollary 10, A must allocate job j to the faster machine and thus cost( A, t ) ≥ opt(x → r ). Moreover, if opt(x → r ) assigns two or more jobs to machine 1, then opt(x → r ) ≥ 2, since otherwise the work of machine of speed r is at least x + 2r − 2 = 2r − 1/r , thus implying opt(x → r ) ≥ 2 − 1/r 2 . Also, observe that opt(t ) = opt(x → 1) = max{x, (2r − 1)/r } = 2 − 1/r . Putting things together, we get
THEOREM 17. For any m ≥ 2 machines with r < 2, no deterministic (NE-) truthful mechanism for the MKP game can guarantee c-approximate solutions, for any c < min r, (1, 1, . . . , 1, r ) and m + 1 jobs of weight 1. Any (NE-) truthful mechanism M = (A, p) assigning no job to the fastest machine incurs a cost of at least 2, while the optimum is 2/r . In this case the approximation ratio is at least r .
PROOF. Consider m machines with speeds
Let us thus assume that A assigns at least one job to the fastest machine, and let j be the index of such a job. Let us consider a new job sequence t = (1, . . . , 1, x, 1, . . . , 1) , where the weight of the j th job has been increased from 1 to x > 1. By Theorem 10, algorithm A cannot allocate this job to a slower machine. Hence, this job must be allocated to the fastest machine and cost( A, t ) ≥ opt(x → r ). For x = 2/r > 1, we have opt(x → r ) = min{2, (1 + 2/r )/r }, as shown in Figure 1 . In the same figure, we prove that opt(t ) ≤ 2/r , thus implying that the approximation ratio of A is bounded from below by
Since r ≤ 
, no deterministic (NE-) truthful mechanism for the MKP game can guarantee c-approximate solutions.
We have seen that for the case of machines of identical speeds, there exists an NE-truthful optimal (albeit exponential-time) mechanism for the makespan (see Corollary 12). Next, we show that no truthful mechanism with respect to dominant strategies can guarantee approximation ratio better than 5/4, even for the case of two machines with the same speed and even if we allow a nonpolynomial mechanism. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the valuation assigned by an agent i to a solution depends on the types of all agents. Instead, in the dual problem of scheduling with selfish machines, for which there exists an optimal mechanism [Archer and Tardos 2001] , the valuation of agent i depends only on his/her own type t i and on some other public input (i.e., the size of the jobs).
THEOREM 19. For any c < 5/4, no deterministic truthful mechanism (with dominant strategies) for the MKP game can guarantee c-approximate solutions, even for the case of two identical machines.
PROOF. Let M = (A, p A ) be a truthful mechanism. We consider an instance consisting of three jobs and declarations b = (2, 1, 3) and b = (4, 1, 3) with two machines with speed s = 1. We first show that for at least one of b and b , M does not return the optimal allocation.
Suppose, by contradiction, that M is an exact mechanism and (since M is truthful) it must be the case that for all t 2 and t 3 , truth-telling is a dominant strategy for agent 1. Hence 4, t 2 , t 3 ) ). By Eqs. (2) and (4), this is equivalent to t 3 ) ) and t 3 ) ). The aforesaid two inequalities can be rewritten as t 3 ) ) and which imply that
It is easy to see that b and b admit only one optimal allocation each. The following 
This condition cannot hold for all t 2 , as otherwise it implies that M knows t 2 . Therefore, for at least one of b and b , M computes a suboptimal solution. We conclude the proof by observing that the second best allocation for b has makespan 4 and that the second best allocation for b has makespan 5.
Extensions of the MKP Game
In this section we discuss some extensions of the MKP game. In Section 5.1 we consider a version of the game where selfish agents also own the machines and in Section 5.2 we consider the problem of routing selfish unsplittable traffic on arbitrary networks.
SELFISH MACHINES.
In this section, we consider the following extension to the MKP game. We have two types of agents: job agents owning jobs and machine agents owning machines. We remark that each machine agent owns only one machine and is the only one to know the real speed of his/her machine. The allocation algorithm elicits from each job agent the weight of his/her job and from each machine agent the speed of his/her machine and, based on the reported data, computes an allocation of jobs to machines. The valuation of a job agent is the same as we have used in the previous sections. However, machine-agent i corresponding to machine i of speed s i has valuation of the form v i (X |t i ) = −W i (X )/s i , where W i (X ) is the work assigned to machine i by solution X . We further assume that machine agents are verifiable. Specifically, payments are provided after the jobs have been completed by the agent and the agent receives payment only if his/her machine completed the jobs within a time corresponding to the reported speed b i and the work W i (X ) assigned to it, that is, after W i (X )/b i time units. In the new scenario, we have to design the payments and allocation algorithm in such a way that job and machine agents have an incentive to reveal the true weight of their jobs and true speed of their machines, respectively. We use algorithm Monotone-Assign-R from Auletta et al. [2005] that, for sake of completeness, is described in Figure 2 . We notice that algorithm Monotone-Assign-R receives as input an upper bound on the makespan of the optimal solution. The following theorem holds. We stress that in the aforementioned mechanism, payments are computed online for each new job and at every time step the machines receive a nonnegative payment.
PROOF. Let be defined as in step 2 of Monotone-Assign-R (see Figure 2 ) and for sake of readability let A denote Monotone-Assign-R. We have
From the preceding we have that if (A(t 1 , . . . , t i−1 ), s j , t i ) = 0, then for any t i > t i it holds that (A(t 1 , . . . , t i−1 ), s j , t i ) = 0. Moreover, Monotone-Assign-R allocates job t i to the slowest machine j for which (A(t 1 , . . . , t i−1 ), s j , t i ) = 1. Thus conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 13 are satisfied and Monotone-Assign-R is regular. (
1) For the n selfish agents owning the jobs, the mechanism is NE-truthful and satisfies the NPT condition. (2) For the m agents owning the machines, if the machines are verifiable, then the mechanism is truthful (with dominant strategies) and satisfies the NPT condition and voluntary participation condition (i.e., truth-telling agents have nonnegative utilities).

MORE GAMES WITH QUASI-ONE-PARAMETER AGENTS.
Corollary 8 can be applied to a routing game on general graphs, as opposed to graphs consisting of a collection of parallel edges as in the MKP game. In particular, we are given a network G = (V, E, l), with l e = 1/s e and s e being the speed of link e ∈ E; moreover, we have n selfish users, each corresponding to a triple (σ i , δ i , t i ), with σ i , δ i ∈ V and t i > 0. A feasible solution is a set X = {X 1 , . . . , X n } of n paths, one for each agent, such that path traffic t i trough the links in X i , and traversing a link e takes time (t i + T e (X |t −i ))/s e . The quantity T e (X |t −i ) is due to the traffic that solution X sends on link e together with traffic t i ; for example, the amount of work that traffic t i finds on link e once entering on this link. The valuation of agent i is thus equal to
that is, the opposite of the time required to transmit from σ i to δ i . This shows that in this general routing game, agents are quasi-one-parameter and thus, by Theorems 6 and 7, a routing algorithm A admits payment functions P such that (A, P) is NE-truthful if and only if A is length-monotone. More precisely, algorithm A is length monotone if, as the weight of request i grows and the weights of other requests do not change, algorithm A assigns paths of decreasing length to request i (the length of path X i is e∈X i 1/s e ).
Agents Owning More than One Job
In this section we investigate the version of the MKP game in which an agent may own more than one job and machine speeds are identical. We have m machines of speed s, l jobs of weight (t 1 , . . . , t l ), and n < l agents. Throughout this section we make use of the following notation: 
The valuation of agent i is equal to minus the sum of the finish times of his/her jobs, that is,
This corresponds to the case in which each customer pays the agent controlling his/her piece of traffic a fixed amount minus the experienced latency of his/her traffic, and each agent wants to maximize the amount of money received from customers.
When algorithm A is clear from the context or immaterial, we will drop the subscript "A" and simply write m j (b), w j (b|t), v i (b|t), and o j (b|t). Without loss of generality we assume that each machine has speed s = 1. 6.1. LOWER BOUNDS. In this section we prove lower bounds on the approximation ratio obtained by truthful mechanisms in the case where agents may own more than one job. Our proofs adopt the following strategy: We fix agent i and the vector t −i of weights of jobs owned by agents other than i and consider two possible declarations b and b for agent i; any (NE-) truthful mechanism M = (A, p) must guarantee that
and
From the previous equations, we derive necessary conditions on the payment function and allocation algorithm of a truthful mechanism, both of which in turn imply a lower bound on the approximation ratio. As the next two theorems show, if agents are allowed to own more than one job and machines have the same speed, then, unlike the case studied in the previous section, not all algorithms A admit payments P so that (A, P) is NE-truthful. We start with a lower bound on the achievable approximation ratio when agents are allowed to own at most 2 jobs. 
, no (NE-)truthful mechanism can guarantee c-approximate solutions on m machines of equal speeds when there is at least one agent that owns 2 jobs.
PROOF. Let M = (A, p) be a truthful mechanism for this problem. Let us consider an instance with m = 2 machines, n = 2 agents, l = 3 jobs, and J 1 = {1, 2} and J 2 = {3}. We consider declarations b = (x , y ) and b = (x , y ) for agent 1, with x ≤ y < 1 and x ≤ 1 < y , and set t −1 = (1). Observe that if M is an optimal mechanism, then the allocation algorithm A must allocate the 2 smallest jobs on the same machine and the largest on the other machine. Thus, on input b or b , algorithm A should produce the following two allocations.
Since M is (NE-) truthful, Eqs. (9) and (10) hold and payments must satisfy
These two inequalities both hold only when x + y ≥ x + y . Hence, we conclude that if M is (NE-)truthful and x + y < x + y , then A cannot give an optimal allocation on both inputs b and b . We now give a lower bound on the approximation ratio of the solution given by
, 1) and b = (
, 1), for some arbitrary small ε > 0. Observe that x + y = x + y − < x + y , which implies that A cannot be optimal on both vectors. Observe that any suboptimal allocation on b must allocate the two jobs of agent 1 on different machines, while on b it must allocate them on the same machine. If A gives a suboptimal allocation on input b , then the cost of A(b ) is at least 1 + x and the approximation ratio is at least −β, where β is arbitrary small (is equal to 1+x ). Hence the theorem follows.
The aforesaid theorem also applies to the case in which agents may own more than two jobs. However, in this case, we can obtain a better lower bound. PROOF. We prove the theorem for m = 2 machines of unitary speed. Let M = (A, p) be a truthful mechanism for this problem. Let us consider an instance with one agent and four jobs and consider two vectors of declared weights b = (1, 1, 1, 1) and b = (x, x, x, 3x − 3) for some x > 0. Observe that if M is an exact mechanism, then for sufficiently large x, A computes the following allocations.
Eqs. (9) and (10) imply that
proving that A cannot compute an optimal allocation on both b and b . Thus, if A computes a suboptimal solution on b (assigning at least 3, jobs to a machine) then its solution costs at least 3, while the optimum is 2. Instead, if A computes a suboptimal solution on b (assigning an even number of jobs to each machine), then its solution costs at least 4x −3 while the optimum is 3x. Hence, for any > 0, there exists a sufficiently large x such that the approximation ratio of A is at least (4/3 − ). This completes the proof.
6.2. UPPER BOUNDS. In this section we will provide a constant-approximation NE-truthful mechanism for the case of an arbitrary number of machines with unitary speed. The main idea is to develop new approximation algorithms for which the valuation functions can be rewritten as those of quasi-one-parameter agents.
We start by observing the following fact. PROOF. For every agent i we define its payment as follows.
Clearly, for every j ∈ J i , we have that o Hence, for b −i = t −i , the utility of agent i does not depend on his declarations and therefore (A, P A ) is an NE-truthful mechanism.
To conclude the proof, observe that payments P i A (·) in Eq. (14) are computable in polynomial time if A runs in polynomial time.
We now give two algorithms for allocating selfish jobs to identical machines when any agent may own several jobs. We start by considering the case in which for each agent i, k i ≤ m or k i is a multiple of m and we give an independent algorithm spread for this simple case (see Figure 3) . Then, we show how this algorithm can be used as a subroutine to design a polynomial-time mechanism that is NE-truthful in the general case.
Algorithm spread considers one agent at-a-time and allocates all jobs of agent i before considering those of agent i + 1. The algorithm spreads the jobs of agent i evenly among the machines according to the following rule: The jobs of agent i are partitioned into subsets J We now prove that spread leads to a polynomial-time NE-truthful 2-approximate mechanism for the case where for each agent i, k i ≤ m or k i is a multiple of m.
We start by studying the approximation factor guaranteed by algorithm spread. For the case k ≤ m, algorithm spread is a simple variant of the greedy algorithm in which no machine receives two jobs from the same agent. We prove that the difference between the maximum and minimum load assigned to the machines by algorithm spread is bounded from above as for the greedy algorithm. Let L i h denote the load of machine h after algorithm spread, on input the vector b, has assigned all jobs of agent i. Let PROOF. We prove the lemma by induction on the agent index i. The lemma clearly holds after the algorithm examins all jobs of agent i = 1 (there is at most one job per machine). Let us assume that the lemma holds after the algorithm examins all jobs of agent i and consider how the algorithm allocates jobs of agent i + 1. Let α and β be the indexes of two machines with maximum and minimum load, respectively, after the algorithm allocates all jobs of agent i + 1. We remark that since k i+1 ≤ m, algorithm spread assigns at most one job of agent i + 1 to each machine. Let x and y denote the weights of the jobs of agent i + 1 assigned to machines α and β, respectively (if no such a job is assigned then we simply consider a "dummy" job of weight 0). Then, we have
We distinguish two possible cases. 
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 29. Thus, we have that PROOF. By Lemma 28, algorithm spread is independent in the particular case where for each agent i, k i ≤ m or k i is a multiple of m. Thus, by Theorem 27 there exist payment functions p spread such that (spread, p spread ) is a polynomial-time NE-truthful mechanism. Moreover, by Lemma 30, algorithm spread is (2 − 1/m)-approximate with respect to the declared weights. However, since the mechanism is NE-truthful, the declared weights coincide with the real weights and thus the mechanism is (2 − 1/m)-approximate.
We now show how algorithm spread can be used as a subroutine in a constantapproximation mechanism that is NE-truthful in the general case where each agent owns any number of jobs. This mechanism is based on algorithm split, shown in 
This quantity is maximized when J The preceding results can be improved when considering small values of m. In particular, we prove the following theorem. PROOF. Consider the following algorithm: First run the Graham's PTAS [Graham 1969 ] for 2 machines to get a (1 + ε)-approximate solution X ; then transform X into a new solution X in the following way. For every agent i such that k i > 1 and X allocates c i > k i /2 jobs on machine j (where j is either 1 or 2), move the c i − k i /2 lightest jobs of i from machine j to the other machine.
It is easy to see that this algorithm is independent. In fact, for each agent i, if k i > 1 then the algorithm assigns k i /2 jobs to each machine. Then, by Theorem 27 there exists a payment scheme for turning this algorithm into an NEtruthful mechanism.
It remains to analyze the approximation guarantee of the mechanism. Observe that the algorithm computes first a solution X that is (1 + ε)-approximate and then computes a solution X from X by moving some of the jobs. In particular, for each agent i, the algorithm may move the c i − k i /2 lightest jobs of agent i. The total weight of the moved jobs is, at most, half of the total weight of the jobs of agent i. Summing over all the agents, we have that at most half of the load of a machine can be moved to the other machine. It follows that the maximum load of X is at most 3/2 times the maximum load of X . Since solution X is (1 + ε)-approximate, we have that the solution computed by the algorithm is (3/2 + ε)-approximate.
Conclusions and Open Problems
In this work, we have investigated a general resource assignment game (which includes the notable example of the selfish routing game of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou) from a mechanism design perspective. In the resulting MRA game, agents cannot directly choose the resources nor refuse the allocation chosen by the allocation algorithm. However, they may still manipulate the system by reporting false information about their requests. The allocation algorithm is also allowed to charge each agent for the use of the resources. We feel this is a very general and natural scenario and other approaches (e.g., suggesting an allocation for the KP model which is a good Nash equilibrium [Feldmann et al. 2003 ]) should consider this aspect of the problem (i.e., the fact that computations are based on the information reported by the agents).
Our characterization of NE-truthful mechanisms for resource assignment games is quite intuitive: If the "weight" of an agent request increases, then the algorithm should not worsen the set of resources that are assigned to this agent. Rather surprisingly, this natural requirement prevents from obtaining arbitrary good approximate solutions, even for the simple scenario of the MKP game. Since this negative result holds no matter what the running time of the algorithm, it can be seen as the price that we have to pay (in terms of performance degradation) when selfish agents are involved in the use of resources. Payments allow to reduce significantly the system degradation that occurs in the "anarchic" KP model, but we still have to pay something!
We have also generalized the MKP game in several directions which consider important aspects of the problem. The topology of the underlying network is an important factor and our characterization for routing on arbitrary graphs implies that the maximum link congestion cannot be minimized, even when all links are the same (the network in the KP model is equivalent to a network connecting source to destination via disjoint paths of different lengths). Our characterization holds also for cost functions other than the maximum link congestion, as the monotonicity condition (Theorems 6 and 7) does not consider the objective function. Similarly, changing the internal scheduling policy as done in Christodoulou et al. [2004] does not affect the mechanism. Indeed, if we change the order in which jobs are executed, then we only affect the "additive" factor add i (X |t −i ) in the definition of quasi-oneparameter agents. As this term is irrelevant for the monotonicity of the allocation algorithm, Theorems 6 and 7 still hold. Therefore, all of our positive/negative results apply and, interestingly, better approximation factors cannot be obtained in this way. Another interesting aspect concerns the extension of the MKP game with selfish machines (Section 5.1): This variant provides a first example of a resource allocation problem in which we have both agents competing and agents owning the resources.
These aspects are considered here separately. An interesting future research direction is to combine them and see whether this affects the approximation guarantee of the mechanisms. It would also be interesting to consider resource allocation games involving agents whose costs functions are not of the form of MRA games (i.e., not quasi-one-parameter). This requires the development of new mechanism design techniques which should depart significantly from the one-parameter setting [Myerson 1981; Archer and Tardos 2001] . A first candidate might be an extension of the MKP game involving more jobs per agent. Our positive results are obtained via independent algorithms which essentially reduce this problem to the quasione-parameter setting. However, it is not clear whether NE-mechanisms can use different algorithms to achieve a better approximation factor.
